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Introduction 
This article examines the current policy and legal framework surrounding the 
scheduling of submerged monuments in English waters, its application and the 
implications for the conservation of underwater cultural heritage arising therefrom. It 
also considers the way in which Historic England (“HE”) undertakes its role, as 
specialist statutory advisor to the Secretary of State for the Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport (“DCMS”), to inform decisions on the scheduling of monuments 
underwater. Set in the context of diminished resources resulting from the 
government’s continuing austerity programme, the current role of executive non-
departmental public bodies such as HE is undoubtedly extremely challenging.2 That 
“challenge” can be manifested variously: however, basic obligations must be fulfilled, 
and be fulfilled in accordance with the requirements of administrative law. The 
discussion below focuses on the extent to which, firstly, the increasingly applied 
judicial requirement to provide an applicant with adequate reasons for a decision 
should apply to scheduling decisions and secondly the circumstance where advice 
given to a minister is rooted in a policy apparently at odds with DCMS’ and HE’s 
otherwise declared policies and possibly contrary to the statutory purposes behind 
the scheduling regime. Put at its simplest, does advice to inform a particular 
scheduling decision from a specialist statutory advisor, which is apparently based on 
the cost to that advisor, stand up to legal scrutiny, when it would appear to run 
contrary to declared policy? 
 
Background 
The amphibious landings in Normandy on 6 June 1944 undoubtedly were a pivotal 
moment in European history. Indeed it has been claimed that the present day EU 
was founded on its blood soaked beaches.3 Both onshore and offshore at Normandy, 
relics of that momentous event remain, now valued as cultural heritage and driving a 
local tourist industry.4 Artefacts from that day also lie just off the UK’s shores, largely 
unseen and forgotten. Two of these sites are the wreck of His Majesty’s Landing 
Craft (Tank) 427 (“LCT 427”) and an assemblage of armoured vehicles (“the 
Assemblage of Armoured Vehicles”), deposited on the seabed when their Royal 
Naval Armoured Tank Landing Craft 2428 (“LCT(A) 2428”) capsized on passage to 
the invasion beaches. Both sites were forgotten but their recent rediscovery 
prompted an attempt to secure their protection through preservation in situ as 
Scheduled Ancient Monuments under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological 
Areas Act 1979 (“the 1979 Act”). This in turn resulted in a surprising controversy over 
the formulation and application of a policy for the scheduling of submerged 
monuments in English waters.  
 
When considering protection for underwater cultural heritage there are two principal 
mechanisms open to regulators. An historic shipwreck wreck can be designated 
under the Protection of Wrecks Act 1973 (“the 1973 Act’”). Shipwrecks and other 
forms of underwater cultural heritage could also be scheduled under the 1979 Act.5  
The 1973 Act was passed as a direct consequence of the looting of wrecks of 
historical interest. Designation and licensing are the chosen mechanisms of control 6. 
The Act authorises the Secretary of State7 to designate as a restricted area the site 
of a vessel of historical, archaeological or artistic importance8 lying wrecked in or on 
the seabed.9 There is no further definition of these criteria in the Act but non-
statutory guidance has been issued10 and the criteria therein reflect those used for 
scheduling monuments under the 1979 Act. The objective is to protect the restricted 
area itself from unauthorised interference and not merely the vessel or its contents. It 
is an offence, within a restricted area, to tamper with, damage or remove any object 
or part of the vessel or to carry out any diving or salvage operation.11 Further 
operations within the area, including public visiting by divers on suitably robust sites, 
are then controlled by the issuing of a licence, authorising only certain specified 
activities. Where a licence is granted, it will be subject to conditions or restrictions, 
appropriate to each individual site.12 Alternatively underwater cultural heritage can 
be scheduled under the 1979 Act.13 In principle, the 1979 Act has significant 
advantages over the 1973 Act. The Act works by the scheduling of monuments.14 
The definition of a “Monument”15 encompasses, inter alia, buildings, structures or 
work, cave or excavation, vehicle, vessel, aircraft or other movable structure.16 Thus 
the Act is far more flexible in its possible 
application than the 1973 Act and, in particular, can apply to flooded landscapes 
such as quarries, cave dwellings and fish traps.17 To be scheduled, the monument 
must be of “national importance”.18 Once scheduled, it is an offence to, inter alia, 
demolish, destroy, alter or repair a monument without “scheduled monument 
consent”.19 In practice, such consent is rarely given, except for rescue excavations, 
and it is the practice of the heritage agencies to pursue a policy of preservation in 
situ, rather than encourage active investigation of monuments by excavation, which 
is seen as destructive. This principle is now enshrined as a cornerstone of the 
Valletta Convention.20 
 
 
The Sites 
The Assemblage of Armoured Vehicles 
On the evening of 5 June 1944, enroute to “Juno” Beach in Normandy, LCT(A) 
242821 developed engine trouble and suffered weather damage. Abandoned and 
leaking, she was taken in tow but capsized, depositing her cargo of two Centaur IV 
CS tanks, two D7 armoured bulldozers22 and a 4x4 vehicle on the seabed, some 
10km to the South of Selsey Bill on the South coast of England. Subsequently LCT(A) 
2428 was sunk by gunfire, presumably as a derelict23 posing a danger to navigation 
and lies some 7km to the East of the vehicle assemblage.24 
 
In 2008 the first systematic survey of the site was conducted over five days by 
avocational divers from the Southsea Branch of the British Sub Aqua Club 
(“Southsea BSAC”) operating under the Nautical Archaeology Society’s “Adopt a 
Wreck” scheme.25 In 2011 a further survey of the site was commissioned by English 
Heritage.26 This survey concluded that the assemblage of armoured vehicles were 
of significance and that there was a level of medium to high risk of further damage 
due to anchoring and legitimate salvage activity by visiting divers.27 
 
 
LCT 427 
His Majesty’s tank landing craft LCT 42728 sank at 03.03 hours on 7 June 1944 at 
Spitbank Gate as she approached Portsmouth, having delivered her cargo of 
Sherman DD tanks29 to “Gold” Beach on D-Day. LCT 427 collided with the 
battleship HMS Rodney,30 which was steaming out to sea. The small LCT offered 
no obstacle to this large capital ship and was sliced completely in two. All 13 crew of 
LCT 427 were lost in the tragedy. Relative to the loss of life occurring across the 
English Channel this was regarded as a minor incident. Indeed for two months LCT 
427 was simply listed as “missing” and when this administrative error was resolved 
the matter was simply regarded as an unfortunate accident with no need for further 
investigation or formal inquiry. LCT 427 had literally slipped into physical and 
historical obscurity, with relatives not being informed of the circumstances or location 
of her loss.31 In 2011 avocational archaeological divers from Southsea BSAC 
obtained permission to investigate an unidentified anomaly lying upright in the main 
shipping channel leading to Portsmouth and Southampton. To their surprise they 
found the two parts of LCT 427 some several hundred metres apart. Lying at an 
average depth of 30m, both parts are in a remarkable state of preservation, with the 
craft’s equipment and armament, including ammunition, still in place.32 
 
Site Context and Protection 
Originating from actual involvement in D-Day, both these sites are unique time 
capsules of this pivotal event. This is especially true of the assemblage of armoured 
vehicles, since the ability to successfully place armour on the invasion beaches in 
order to breach enemy coastal emplacements and avoid troops being pinned down 
on the beaches, unable to get off the beachhead, had been identified as a key 
requirement following the disaster of the “Dieppe Raid” in 1942.33 The Centaur 
tanks and armoured bulldozers were specialist equipment specifically developed to 
avoid another bloody repulse of invading Allied forces on D-Day. In particular the 
Centaur IV CS tanks are extremely rare survivors of this epic historical event. The 
A27L Centaur, notoriously underpowered and unreliable, has been described as “a 
tank that should never have been built”.34 It was deemed unfit for front line service 
as a main battle tank but saw combat in a specialised role on D-Day. Some 80 
Centaurs were fitted with a 95mm howitzer,35 designated as “Centaur IV CS”, 
issued to the Royal Marines Armoured Support Group36 and used to neutralise 
concrete bunkers on the beachhead in close support of the first waves of invading 
forces. As the invading forces successfully moved inland this specialised role 
evaporated and within a fortnight the Centaurs IV CS tanks were withdrawn from 
service.37 The tanks are therefore uniquely associated with D-Day and today only 
two other examples are known to survive, both located in France.38 The submerged 
examples are the only ones present in the UK. 
Following the archaeological surveys and assessments of both sites Ms Alison 
Mayor39 sought recognition of and protection for their cultural significance as rare 
survivors of their type and as direct participants in the events of D-Day by having the 
sites scheduled as ancient monuments.40 Doing so would afford access for ongoing 
monitoring and survey while at the same time permitting continued public access by 
divers. 
 
Scheduling was thought to be particularly appropriate for the assemblage of 
armoured vehicles due to their relatively robust construction, while perhaps less so 
for the site of LCT 427, given that the degree of public access was already 
constrained by the requirement to obtain permission to dive in the main shipping 
channel for Portsmouth and Southampton harbours. The scheduling applications 
were made in December 2011 but the determinations of the applications were 
subject to significant delay amounting to over four years. This was apparently 
caused by policy deliberations within the management of HE.41 In the summer of 
2015, in response to concern expressed about this delay to HE by its advisory panel 
on Historic Wrecks42 and the Nautical Archaeology Society,43HE confirmed that it 
had recently formulated a policy that scheduling under the 1979 Act below mean low 
water would not be considered, apparently irrespective of the merits of any individual 
application. 
The Scheduling Process 
The Secretary of State for DCMS has a power under s.1(3) of the 1979 Act to 
schedule a monument and such scheduling is the principal mechanism for protecting 
a monument under the 1979 Act. As the policy guidance published by DCMS44 
makes clear this power is discretionary and encompasses monuments located below 
the Mean Low Water Mark45 (“MLWM”) out to the boundary of English territorial 
waters.46This enables the UK to discharge its international obligations,47 under both 
the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
197248 and the European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological 
Heritage 1995.49 It is also noteworthy that DCMS’ policy guidance contains no 
caveats as to the inadvisability of scheduling monuments below the MLWM.As the 
policy guidance from DCMS makes clear: “In practice, the Secretary of State usually 
considers recommendations put forward by [Historic England] together with the 
implications of designating ScheduledMonuments.”50 While the Secretary of State’s 
discretion cannot be exercised exclusively or automatically upon the basis of HE’s 
advice, since that would be an unlawful fettering of the discretion,51 nevertheless the 
recommendations from HE are likely to be highly influential, if not predominantly so, 
upon the exercise by the Secretary of State of this discretion whether to designate or 
not. Indeed the courts have consistently recognised that specialist agencies, such as 
HE possess an expertise with which they should be very “slow to interfere”.52 This 
caution by the courts not to substitute its judgement for that of a discretionary 
decision maker is reflected in the fact that they will afford such regulators 
considerable latitude when evaluating the lawfulness of any exercise of statutory 
discretion in a specialist field.53 This approach was recently 
 
unanimously approved of by the Court of Appeal,54 which emphasised that an 
“enhanced margin of appreciation” will be extended to a regulator where specialist 
judgement is involved in matters of scientific, technical and predictive 
assessments.55 Doubtless this approach would also be applied not only by the 
courts to the Secretary of State’s decision, but also by the Secretary of State himself 
when considering He’s recommendation as to whether or not to schedule. 
Consequently, as an expert body, HE’s advice, while neither binding nor 
unquestionable, would usually be accepted.56 However such latitude has its 
boundaries. The discretion in question must be genuinely exercised in evaluating 
each application on its merits. It also places a clear duty upon the decision-maker to 
advance a clear and accurate explanation of the reasoning underpinning the 
decision.57 
 
DCMS and HE Policy Guidance 
Before exercising this discretion to schedule, the Secretary of State will have regard 
to a number of non-statutory criteria.58 These are set out in DCMS’ policy guidance 
document and it is acknowledged that they are not definitive and that the Secretary 
of State must take into account any other material considerations. In turn the 
rationale for HE’s recommendations on scheduling is set out in its Scheduling 
Selection Guides. These cover a range of heritage aspects, the most appropriate in 
this context being “Designation Scheduling Selection Guide Maritime and Naval”59 
and “Designation Scheduling Selection Guide Ships and Boats: Prehistory and 
Present”.60 Again these guides are intended only to be indicative of the broad 
approach of HE to advising the Secretary of State on applications for scheduling. 
They also specifically caution that they are subordinate to DCMS’ policy on 
scheduling and that scheduling is not intended to produce a complete compendium 
of nationally important sites61 but rather to capture a representative sample of such 
sites.62 The guides also acknowledge that monuments vary considerably in 
character and that they can be protected by a variety of mechanisms, including 
arrangements with stakeholders and that HE’s objective is to recommend the most 
appropriate mechanism for protection for each asset.63 Indeed identifying the best 
form of management for any particular site is expressly stated to be the “primary 
concern” when considering how management of the site in question can best be 
achieved.64This clearly implies an individual assessment by HE as to the most 
appropriate mechanism for protecting a site, using in this individual assessment the 
broad approaches identified in the selection guides and contemplates scheduling as 
a potential management tool.65 
 
The Application of Scheduling Policy Underwater 
HE’s Historic Wreck Panel met in July 2015 and was informed that “[Historic England] 
will not be promoting the scheduling of permanently submerged wrecks in the marine 
zone”.66 It was not all together clear exactly what this denoted, in that “not 
promoting” scheduling could simply mean taking a passive, reactive stance rather 
than a proactive one in considering the possibility of scheduling. However 
correspondence received subsequently by Ms. Alison Mayor in respect of her 
application to schedule LCT427 provided greater clarification. On 9 November 2015 
Ms. Mayor received an email from He’s Designation Team Leader (South) Listing 
Group apologising for the delay in responding to her application but stating that: 
“… this case then got caught up in a much wider discussion at Senior 
Management level about the appropriateness of scheduling in the sea. This 
has only very recently resulted in a Historic England policy that we will not 
recommend the scheduling of such assets. This therefore means that we are 
not able to recommend LCT427 for scheduling either.”67 
This clearly indicates that HE would not recommend scheduling a site below the 
MLWM in any circumstances, irrespective of the merits of the individual application. 
This interpretation was confirmed when subsequently Ms. Mayor received a copy of 
HE’s recommendations to the Secretary of State in respect of her application to 
schedule LCT 427.68 
 
HE’s Recommendations: LCT 42769 
The advice, dated 18 November 2015, confirmed that consideration of the matter 
had been completed in May 2014 but a decision had been placed on hold pending a 
wider policy discussion within HE considering scheduling below the MLWM and that 
as those discussions were now concluded the application could be determined. 
Having identified potential threats to the site from dredging and fishing,70 the site 
was assessed against the non-statutory criteria as set out in the DCMS policy 
guidance and HE’s selection guide on “Designation Scheduling Selection Guide 
Ships and Boats: Prehistory and Present”.71 The advice concluded that the wreck 
meets the criteria for scheduling but “… as it is HE policy not to apply the 1979 Act to 
remains below Mean Low Water Mark it cannot be recommended for scheduling”.72 
The advice then goes on to state that amongst the reasons for the decision, under 
the criterion “Policy” that “It is HE policy not to use the 1979 Act to schedule below 
the Mean Low Water Mark and therefore the wreck cannot bescheduled”.73 This 
would appear to establish beyond doubt that HE’s policy of not scheduling below the 
MLWM was used as an absolute bar to scheduling, no matter what the merits of the 
individual application and that no exceptions were being contemplated. The advice 
was then subject to an internal review, presumably as part of a normal HE process. 
In case any doubt remained as to the correctness of this interpretation, the 
“Countersigning Comments” seem to have placed the matter beyond dispute by 
stating, inter alia, that “After discussion with colleagues across the organisation it has 
now been agreed that we will not consider scheduling sites that are permanently 
submerged for the time being”.74 
The reasons for this policy were iterated in the “Countersigning Comments”. These 
were that the 1979 Act had not previously been used below the MLWM, so there was 
no precedent for such use; that there was no appetite in NPCD75 for such 
scheduling; that it is unhelpful to introduce another level of protection in a “complex 
zone” where HE’s focus is the application of the Protection of Wrecks Act 1973 (“the 
PWA1973”); that scheduling duplicates the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986 
(“the PMRA 1986”); the high costs of assessment and post-designation management; 
that Marine Planning is beyond the terrestrial planning system with different 
mechanisms and finally, that protection for such sites is being sought through entry 
on the Marine Record along with the development of a protocol with the Marine 
Management Organisation (“MMO”). 
The cogency of this reasoning is considered below, but from the above statements it 
would not be unreasonable to draw the conclusion that this previously undisclosed 
policy amounts to an absolute prohibition upon consideration of scheduling, 
irrespective of the circumstances of each application. HE effectively pre-determined 
any decision, vis, no site will be scheduled below the Low Watermark, 
notwithstanding that its published policy, which is not limited to terrestrial application 
by the 1979 Actor its published policy guidance, is to recommend the best form of 
management for a site as a “primaryconcern”.76Therefore what appears to have 
occurred is the evolution of a policy, as yet unstated, by HE to not consider 
scheduling any monuments underwater, irrespective of the merits of the application. 
This policy exists within the Secretary of State’s declared policy of contemplating the 
scheduling of such monuments and which makes no mention of the restrictive policy 
outlook now taken by HE. It would appear that there is now a substantive dichotomy 
of policy between DCMS and its statutory advisors. In part this appears to have been 
driven by financial resource implications for HE, in that it not only acts as a statutory 
advisor to the Secretary of State as to whether scheduling of a site is advisable, but 
also, should such scheduling occur, then acts as the executive body responsible for 
assessing and monitoring the scheduled ancient monument. HE is thus in an 
invidious position, in that its purely advisory functions on scheduling have potentially 
adverse financial implications for it as an executive agency. To that extent HE’s 
concerns for its financial resources as an executive agency have, perhaps inevitably, 
tainted its advisory function to the Secretary of State. The question then arises as to 
whether this fettering of its discretion by HE has legal implications for the validity of 
advice proffered by HE on scheduling applications and what, if any, are the policy 
implications? 
Subsequently, on the 3 December 2015 Ms Mayor received an email confirming that 
having considered HE’s recommendation, the Secretary of State for DCMS had 
decided not to add HM Landing Craft Tank 427 to the Schedule of Monuments. The 
decision letter gave no express reasons for this decision: presumably the reference 
to HE’s recommendations was intended to convey the explanation that the Secretary 
of State had adopted HE’s reasoning. 
 
HE’s Recommendations: Assemblage of Armoured Vehicles77 
On 1 April 2016 Ms Mayor received confirmation that, having considered HE’s 
recommendation, the Secretary of State for DCMS had decided not to add the 
vehicle assemblage to the Schedule of Monuments. Again the decision letter gave 
no express reasons for this decision but presumably a reference therein to HE’s 
recommendations was similarly intended to convey the explanation that the 
Secretary of State had adopted HE’s advice. By way of contrast HE’s advice to the 
Secretary of State in respect of this site was somewhat limited. The advice was 
replete with conclusions such as “… scheduling is not the appropriate mechanism”, 
“scheduling them is not appropriate in this instance at this time” and “scheduling is 
not deemed to be the appropriate management regime”.78 Additionally the advice 
concluded that “while scheduling could be used to recognise their significance, it 
would not assist their management, and indeed could hamper such 
management …”.79 No explanation was given as to how or why scheduling would 
not assist and could hamper the site’s management. While these conclusions would 
leave an objective reader in no doubt as to what conclusions the Advice reached, it 
would be impossible to discern why HE came to its conclusion that scheduling was 
not appropriate and could hamper management of the site. 
Furthermore, despite acknowledging that the site “is at risk from fishing and sports 
diving which has resulted in some damage to the site” the advice also stated, again 
without giving reasons, that their “significance is better recognised through 
enhancement of the marine record, flagging of this significance to appropriate bodies 
(e.g. the MMO, MCA, UKHO and Port and Harbour Authorities etc.)”.80 Finally, and 
somewhat bizarrely in the circumstances, the advice asserted that “However, these 
vehicles could be managed through natural environment designations”.81 
 
The Legal Framework 
The Duty to Consider each Application on its Merits 
The fundamental principles governing the exercise of a statutory discretionary power 
are long established. While this area of law remains one of the most kinetic, these 
basic tenets can be regarded as well settled. A decision maker, charged with a 
statutory discretion, must consider each issue upon its individual merits. A policy can 
be legitimately developed and that policy may set an extremely high bar against a 
particular authorisation being granted, but the policy on a discretionary judgement 
cannot amount to an absolute prohibition in all circumstances, or a refusal to 
consider an issue upon its individual merits as a potential exception to the 
established policy norm. In short, a discretionary decision maker may develop a 
policy but cannot close its mind to considering departure from that policy in each 
individual case. This principle is simply illustrated by the case of R. v London County 
Council ex p. Corrie.82 A local Bye-Law required written permission from the Council 
for the sale of articles in any public park. The Council adopted a policy, by way of 
resolution, of refusing all applications for permission to sell articles. Mrs Corrie, who 
wished to sell pamphlets, sought judicial review of the Council’s refusal, relying on 
this policy, to consider her application for permission. The Court held that the Council 
had a discretion whether or not to grant permission for such sales. While the Council 
could lawfully adopt such a policy nevertheless that policy could not be used to fetter 
its discretion. The Council’s use of the policy to refuse to contemplate ever granting 
permission fettered its discretion to such an extent that there was in reality no 
possible exercise of discretion whatsoever.83 Each case, while it must be measured 
against the existing policy, had to be considered on its merits and the policy could 
not be used to justify refusal in all circumstances without consideration of each 
application.84 
An even closer analogy can be found in the recent case of R. (on the application of 
McMorn) v Natural England.85 The case concerned a challenge to Natural England’s 
refusal to grant a licence to kill a small number of Buzzards and to destroy four nests. 
A licence is required to kill or capture them under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 
1981, and the claimant applied to Natural England (“NE “) for such a licence on five 
separate occasions between 2011 and 2014. The basis of these applications was 
the claim that the buzzards were causing significant damage to his pheasant “poults” 
by killing and disturbing them. By way of background Ouseley J. pointed out that the 
Claimant had been granted licences by NE to kill a number of herring and great 
black-backed gulls on the farms in 2011 and 2013, and, also in 2013, to kill three 
cormorants, in respect of damage done to partridge and fishing interests respectively. 
While NE had a discretionary power to refuse or grant a licence, the generic policy 
on culling birds was set by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(“DEFRA”). DEFRA had a specific policy on culling certain birds but not on raptors, 
such as Buzzards. The applicable policy guidance was therefore the generic one on 
birds. This contemplated culling where appropriate. In the absence of a specific 
raptor policy by DEFRANE developed an undisclosed policy which, in effect, 
amounted to a mind-set where culling raptors could not be contemplated. Thus a 
policy dichotomy opened up where Defra’s policy contemplated culling in certain 
circumstances whereas NE’s undisclosed policy did not contemplate such a 
possibility. NE’s policy was both undisclosed and differed substantially from 
DEFRA’s publicly stated policy position, which was intended to be the dominant 
policy statement. The Court held that NE had acted unreasonably, in a 
Wednesbury86 sense, in fettering the exercise of its statutory discretion. 
The analogy of the McMorn case to the policy dichotomy between DCMS and HE on 
scheduling below the MLWM is clear. DCMS’ stated policy on scheduling expressly 
contemplates scheduling below the MLWM, as indeed does HE’s publicly stated 
policy in its Selection Guides. Neither policy guidance draws any distinction between 
scheduling above the MLWM (terrestrial and foreshore) and below it. However HE’s 
hitherto undisclosed and currently unstated policy87 is not to consider the possibility 
of scheduling below the MLWM, notwithstanding its own policy position stated in its 
Selection Guides and the fact that HE’s policy is intended to be subordinate to 
DCMS’ policy statement. HE, in formulating its advice to the Secretary of State, is 
therefore relying upon an unstated policy, which it has formulated itself, which 
fundamentally counters the policy of DCMS, to which it is meant to be subordinate: it 
differentiates between scheduling above and below the MLWM and refuses to 
countenance the possibility of the latter. HE’s policy thus appears entirely 
inconsistent with that of DCMS, its own publicly stated policy and fetters its 
discretionary judgement in formulating that advice by refusing to contemplate 
scheduling below the MLWM. 
Alternatively it could be argued that in rigidly applying its policy of not considering 
scheduling below the MLWM without giving any consideration to whether the 
circumstances of the application merited a departure from that policy, HE had in 
effect predetermined its advice upon the application. Predetermination has been 
described as “… a surrender by a decision maker of its judgement by having a 
closed mind and failing to apply it to the task”.88 In determining whether 
predetermination has occurred one must be careful to distinguish between 
predetermination and predisposition. Where, as here, a policy exists, an 
administrative decision maker will be naturally predisposed to applying that policy. 
This is quite legitimate and indeed to do otherwise would in effect negate the whole 
purpose of developing a policy framework. What is not acceptable is that the 
decision maker makes its mind up at too early a stage without balancing the policy 
against the merits of departing from that policy in the circumstances of the individual 
application.89It would appear that once HE had decided to introduce this new policy 
that no scheduling below the MLWM would occur, all applications for such 
scheduling were to be rejected, irrespective of their merit. That would constitute 
predetermination. Accordingly HE appears to have failed to exercise correctly its 
statutory function of advising the Secretary of State fairly. 
However, when considering the legality of the application of this policy position by 
HE, the matter is not quite a straightforward comparison to the above principles. Had 
HE been making the scheduling decision its refusal to consider even the possibility 
of scheduling LCT 427 due to the wreck’s location86 So named after the decision in 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 K.B. 223 
which established the principle that a decision is unreasonable when it is one no 
rational person could have made in the circumstances. 
 
below the MLWM would clearly be an unlawful fettering of its statutory discretion90 
and a predetermination of the application. However it is the Secretary of State for 
DCMS who makes the decision whether or not to schedule,91HE merely having a 
statutory advisory role. Thus, while HE may have fettered its discretion and 
predetermined its advice it is not the decision maker, the Secretary of State is. 
Consequently two questions arise. First, is HE’s blanket application of policy in itself 
ultra vires its statutory duties under the National Heritage Act 1983 (“the 1983 Act”)? 
Second, can this fettering of discretion and predetermination by HE therefore taint 
the Secretary of State’s decision of whether or not to schedule ? Under the 1983 
Act92HE has a statutory duty, so far as practicable, to secure the preservation of 
ancient monuments in England93. Before scheduling any monument the Secretary 
of State is required to consultHE.94 There is no corresponding express statutory 
duty on HE to advise the Secretary of State in response to this consultation but 
arguably such a duty can be implied from HE’s statutory duty to secure the 
preservation of ancient monuments in England. Given HE’s policy decision not to 
consider the possibility of scheduling any sites below the MLWM, irrespective of the 
merits of each application for scheduling, it can be argued that HE has not 
discharged this duty under the 1983 Act to secure the preservation of ancient 
monuments in England and has additionally fettered its discretion in such a manner 
as to undermine the purpose of the power given to it by that Act to advise the 
Secretary of State.95 Additionally its reliance upon an undisclosed policy in 
formulating its advice may constitute unreasonableness or irrationality within a 
Wednesbury sense. To that extent it may be argued that HE has potentially not 
properly exercised its statutory duties in formulating its advice to the Secretary of 
State. 
To what extent could such an improper exercise of advisory functions potentially taint 
the Secretary of State’s decision?96 In deciding whether or not to schedule a 
monument of accepted national importance the court in R. v Secretary of State for 
the Environment ex. p. Rose Theatre Trust Co97accepted that the Secretary of State 
has a very wide discretion, stretching beyond the stated non-statutory criteria.98 
Moreover, it has been noted above that the advice of a specialist statutory advisor 
carries significant, if not predominant weight, since the courts acknowledge their 
expertise in the matter and afford an enhanced margin of appreciation to 
discretionary decisions based on such specialism in technical matters. Nevertheless, 
to the extent that the Secretary of State relied upon HE’s advice, formulated on an 
inconsistency with his own policy, he may thus have been departing from that policy 
without a reasoned justification for so doing. If it could be established that the 
Secretary of State had afforded such predominance of weight to HE’s 
recommendation, based as it was on a previously undisclosed and contradictory 
policy to his own and a refusal to consider the application individually, then it is 
arguable that the Secretary of State had taken into account advice which was indeed 
legally flawed. In turn this may vitiate his own decision.99 Conversely if the Secretary 
of State could demonstrate that HE’s refusal to countenance scheduling below the 
MLWM had been discounted and regard paid purely to HE’s evaluation of the merits 
of the application, if any, by a local authority planning officer to its planning 
committee, though in the event it was found not to have occurred,t hen the decision 
could be upheld.100 As ever in a judicial review of administrative decisions much 
would turn upon interpretation of the wording of the decision letter.101 
The Duty to give Reasons 
The 1979 Act does not expressly provide for the giving of reasons for the Secretary 
of State’s decision whether or not to schedule. Nor generally does the Common Law 
imply such a duty in respect of administrative decisions.102 However there has been 
a discernible drift by the Courts towards increasingly requiring reasons to be given 
for administrative decisions in certain circumstances.103 This drift has predominantly 
centred upon decisions adversely impacting personal liberty, economic benefits or 
obligations and more recently matters concerned with, broadly, environmental 
regulation and protection. While the decision not to schedule this site involves no 
adverse impacts upon such interests or obligations, nevertheless there is a clear 
public interest in securing appropriate conservation of underwater cultural heritage if 
heritage is to be understood as a component of a broader definition 
ofenvironment.104 In particular the courts have increasingly required the stating of 
reasons where their absence would render any right of review nugatory. As the 
Supreme Court has recently stated, the right to make representations, which the 
Secretary of State’s decision letter conferred upon Ms. Mayor by inviting a request to 
review the decision not to schedule, is somewhat valueless unless one has advance 
knowledge of the considerations that may lead to an adverse administrative 
decision.105 This judicial drift has possibly now reached its zenith when the Court of 
Appeal recently affirmed that the enhanced margin of appreciation afforded by the 
courts to specialist public bodies when evaluating the lawfulness of their decision 
making in technical or scientific matters carries with it a corresponding burden to 
provide a full and accurate explanation of all the relevantfacts.106 Although this duty 
was articulated in the context of a duty to assist the court with a “full and accurate 
explanations of all the facts relevant to the issue [of lawfulness of the decision]”107, 
it is submitted that, in the light of the Supreme Court’s observations that advance 
knowledge of the reasons underpinning an administrative decision is a prerequisite 
of an appeal, this duty to provide a clear and accurate explanation of reasoning must 
logically also extend to a recipient of such an administrative decision.108 Otherwise 
any right of appeal may indeed be rendered nugatory. 
Additionally the courts have also required the provision of reasons on the basis of 
the Common Law presumption that where an Act confers a discretionary 
administrative power it will be exercised in a manner which is fair in all the 
circumstances.109 This presumption has been justified as leading to better decision-
making by ensuring the decision maker receives all relevant information, that it is 
properly tested and that it requires decision-makers to listen to persons who have 
something relevant to say, thereby 
 
 
promoting congruence between the decision-makers and the law which governs their 
actions.110 This Common Law duty of procedural fairness will extend to provision of 
reasons, where their absence means worthwhile representations cannot be made 
without knowledge of such reasons.111Where reasons must be provided they 
should at least constitute a genuine and reasoned discussion insufficient detail to 
enable a response to be formulated.112 It is not necessary that all the reasoning 
behind the decision is revealed but the grounds on which the decision is reached 
should be set out clearly.113 It would appear that the Secretary of State’s decision 
letter, accompanied by HE’s Advice by way of explanation, falls far short of this 
standard for both sites. In particular the paucity of reasoning in HE’s advice, upon 
which the Secretary of State based his decision on the assemblage of armoured 
vehicles, made Ms. Mayor’s subsequent request for a review of the decision 
extremely difficult to formulate.114 In such circumstances this might well lead a court 
to requiring sufficient reasons to be adduced that would enable an effective review of 
scheduling decisions to be conducted. Such an approach would be contrary to that 
taken in R. v Secretary of State for the Environment Ex p. Rose Theatre Trust Co115 
but, as notedabove, subsequent cases are strongly indicative of a significant change 
in judicial attitudes. 
 
Acknowledged Risks to the Site of the Armoured Vehicles 
There is a long history of divers recovering souvenirs from wrecks, especially those 
of a historical nature, which appears to date from the earliest days of hard hat 
diving.116 The tradition was readily adopted by recreational Scuba divers from the 
1950’s onwards but following a public outcry at the end of last century over the 
practice in relation to wartime military wrecks117 the maritime archaeological 
community and the recreational diving organisations have pursued an extensive 
public education initiative to reduce thepractice.118 This initiative, combined with 
activation of the Protection of Military Remains Act 1986,119appears to have 
diminished the problem120 but such souvenir hunting still occurs and constitutes a 
risk to this site which was been expressly acknowledged by HE in its advice. It also 
remains the case that, in the absence of statutory protection through scheduling, 
such recoveries of artefacts by divers are lawful acts of salvage.121 The vehicles 
were cargo from LCT(A) 2428 and the courts have long recognised that the recovery 
of items of cargo, including cargo from sunken warships,122constitutes a legitimate 
act of salvage.123 Furthermore, while most commercial salvage is contractual, 
 
neither permission from the owner nor the existence of a contract is a perquisite to 
salvage. Salvage maybe entirely ‘ex contractu’.124 Provided therefore that the 
necessary statutory requirements, such as reporting the recovery to the Receiver of 
Wreck125, are complied with there is no impediment to divers recovering items from 
the vehicles, irrespective of the damage such removals would inflict on the 
archaeological integrity of the site. It may be the case that in concluding that the 
site’s significance “… is better recognised through … flagging of this significance to 
appropriate bodies (e.g. the MMO, MCA, UKHO and Port and Harbour Authorities 
etc.)”.126HE was under the impression that such salvage required some form of 
prior consent. In particular this may have been the case in respect of marine 
licensing, given the reference to the MMO,127 which administers marine licensing in 
English waters. A marine licence is required for the use of any vessel or floating 
container, such as a lifting bag used by divers to recover objects by adding buoyancy, 
to remove any object from the sea bed.128 On the face of it that requirement would 
encompass any removal of artefacts from the tanks. However the MMO’s 
interpretation of this requirement is that the removal of objects by a diver “by hand”, 
without the use of a floating container, does not require a marine licence.129 
Consequently divers may lawfully recover whatever items from the vehicles that they 
can carry by hand and notification of the site’s significance to the organisations and 
authorities identified in the Advice does nothing to afford protection to the site from 
this risk.130It would appear therefore that HE may have misdirected itself in law in 
that its conclusions may be, impart, predicated upon a misunderstanding of salvage 
law and the marine licensing regime. Alternatively HE may have failed to take into 
account a material consideration i.e. that voluntary salvage using recovery by hand 
of artefacts from the vehicles is a lawful activity that does not require consent from 
either the owner or the MMO and is not predicated upon the existence of a salvage 
contract. In turn, in placing reliance on the Advice Report from Historic England in 
respect of this particular aspect, the Secretary of State may have misdirected himself 
and failed to take into account a material consideration. 
 
Natural Environment Management 
The most challenging assertion made by HE in their Advice is the statement that the 
“vehicles could be managed by natural environment designations”.131 These 
designations are unspecified, which necessarily, then, requires the appellant to 
undertake an exercise in speculation as to what HE might be contemplating. A 
“natural” environment designation would usually not contemplate a vehicle since, by 
definition, it is not flora, fauna or geology. In that respect, a number of designations 
and devices are considered in the context of their utility and potential, if unlikely, fit. 
The decision takers could perhaps have been considering that certain site 
designations which permit prohibitions or restrictions on activities which may result in 
harm to natural features, such as priority species and habitats, may then provide a 
non-targeted but ancillary benefit to benthic archaeology. Certainly there is the 
possibility that damaging activities such as bottom-trawling or salvage operations in 
territorial waters might equate to a plan or project requiring an appropriate 
assessment under the requirements of the Habitats Regulations;132 or that the 
activity might be occurring within a Marine Conservation Zone 
 
(“MCZ”),133 outlined below. That however would make protection of a heritage 
feature wholly dependent upon the alignment of a serendipitous course of events. As 
it transpired, the areas in which the vessel/vehicles lie are not a part of a Special 
Area of Conservation and in this particular case a check with the Devon and Severn 
Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority134 confirmed that no natural 
environmental designations in force at the coordinates of the vehicles. 
An additional possibility is that confusion has arisen as a result of the difference 
between Marine Protected Area (“MPA”) definitions set out in the Marine and Coastal 
Access Act 2009 (“MACAA”) and the Marine (Scotland) Act 2010 (“MSA”). Regarding 
the former, s.117(c) of MACAA makes provision for the designation of a MCZ for the 
purpose of conserving “… features of geological or geomorphological interest”. 
However, the MSA provides for the designation of a “historic marine protected area” 
(“Historic MPA”) to protect a “marine historic asset of national importance”135 in 
addition to those MPAs which are focused upon the ‘familiar’ natural environment 
designations. 136 Additional designation requirements for Historic MPAs are set out 
in s.73, including in s.73 (5) a definition of a marine historic asset which includes 
both vessels and vehicles and/or their remains.137 The MSA adopts a broader 
protective scope than the MACAA, such that the latter could not be used to manage 
the protection of tanks, bulldozers or landing craft, whatever their heritage value. 
A final possibility might perhaps contemplate an Environmental Impact Assessment 
(“EIA”), even though this is not a wholly natural environment-focused measure. While 
heritage is specifically contemplated by the Regulations,138 their application is 
parasitical upon an application for development which would fall into the categories 
specified in the Annexes to the EIA Directive. Were there to be development 
proposed for a site where there was a scheduled monument then, according to 
Schedule 1of the EIA Regulations139 the area would be a sensitive area and 
immediately trigger the necessity for an EIA. In the absence of that designation, 
unless there were other features compelling an EIA, a systematic evaluation might 
not take place. At any rate, even if there were an EIA, it is not to say for certain that 
adequate protection would be secured through planning or marine licensing 
conditions applied as a result. The key issue there though is that there is absolutely 
no protection conferred unless that is some way referential to a development project. 
It is difficult to envisage a development project affecting the Selsey Bill site other 
than perhaps pursuant to extractive dredging.140 The site of LCT 427 would be 
likely to engage the marine licensing regime pursuant to Part 4 of the MACAA to the 
extent that there might be maintenance dredging required to the shipping channel. 
141 In both cases however, the lack of an applied protective designation for the 
features would mean that there would be no automatic consideration by the 
competent authority. It would thus appear that, without more detailed explanation, 
HE’s assertions in respect of the protective potential of natural environment 
designations are at best questionable and at worst obfuscating. 
 
 
Rationale 
While it is not possible to disentangle the full rationale for HE’s change of policy 
towards the use of the1979 Act below MLWM, since this has been not fully publicly 
articulated, some observations can be usefully made on the reasoning set out in the 
Counter Signing Comments in HE’s advice on LCT 427.142The most striking 
comments were that the 1979 Act had not previously been used below the MLWM 
sothere was no precedent for such use and that scheduling duplicates the PMRA 
1986.The former comment is inaccurate as the 1979 Act has been used to schedule 
wrecks in both England, Scotland and Wales. It was first used underwater in 
Scotland for the protection of seven wrecks of the German High Sea Fleet in Scapa 
Flow, scheduled as two groups of 3 and 4 wrecks on 23 May 2001.143The 1979 Act 
was chosen specifically as a protection mechanism as the sites were robust and the 
administrative complications of licensing the many divers that visit each of the 
wrecks would have been prohibitive. The Scottish experience has been largely 
positive and no more expensive that protecting the sites under the 1973 Act. In 
Wales the wreck of the Louisa located within Cardiff Bay was scheduled on27 
December 2001, over two years after it became submerged at all times by the 
impoundment of Cardiff Bay in November 1999.144 When English Heritage 
published its initial policy for management of marine archaeology in 2001,145 it 
noted that whilst the 1979 Act could be used to protect monuments on the seabed, it 
had not yet been used to this effect.146 However it did note that Historic Scotland 
had made it their policy to use the 1979 Act in preference to the 1973 Act where 
marine sites are established diver attractions that provided local economic benefits 
or where the 1973 Act would be restrictive in a way counter-productive to the long 
term wellbeing of the site.147 It also stated that it would monitor the success of the 
application of the 1979 Act in Scotland and would consider its use as part any review 
of the statutory and managementframework.148 This monitoring would appear to 
have confirmed the Scottish success because on 8 November2013 English Heritage 
scheduled a “Phoenix Caisson” that formed part of the “Mulberry” floating harbour 
which is located in the Straits of Dover, approximately 660m to seaward of the low 
water mark.149 
The latter comment (i.e. that scheduling duplicates the PMRA 1986) reveals a 
profound misunderstanding of the origins and objectives of the 1986 Act. The 
objective of the 1986 Act is to protect the last known resting place of military 
personnel lost in the service of their country from unauthorised 
disturbance.150Beyond that it has no heritage management objectives or powers. 
Consequently the Ministry of Defence(“MOD”) undertakes no monitoring, surveys or 
archaeological assessments of such military remains designated under the 1986 Act, 
nor does it currently have the capacity to do so.151 Consequently the Act, as 
presently administered, provides no heritage management facilities beyond this 
prohibition and MOD does not see either the Act or indeed itself as having a 
proactive heritage management function beyond this prohibition of unauthorised 
disturbance. Consequently MOD cannot be viewed as a capable heritage 
management organisation for in situ underwater cultural heritage. It is also worth 
noting that, while in this specific instance LCT 427 could be protected under the 
1986 Act that Act has no application to wider 
 
underwater cultural heritage such as civilian vessels152 and aircraft or manmade 
flooded structures such as caves. All in all it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
the assertion that the 1986 Act simply duplicates the 1979 Act (and presumably also 
the 1973 Act) appears to have its foundation more in a desire to pass the costs of 
heritage management onto another government department rather than in a studied 
appraisal of the respective heritage management capacities of the two Acts. 
It is also difficult to understand the rationale behind the comments that “… it is 
unhelpful to introduce another level of protection in a ‘complex zone’ where HE’s 
focus is the application of the Protection of Wrecks Act 1973 …” and that there are 
“… high costs of assessment and post-designation management”. While the 1973 
Act differs from the 1979 Act in that the former prohibits unauthorised diving or 
salvage operations directed to the exploration of a designated wreck, the latter does 
not prohibit access by divers. However both Acts prohibit unauthorised intrusive or 
damaging activities and in recent years English Heritage sought to increasingly 
afford public access to wrecks designated under the 1973 Act by facilitating the grant 
of licences for divers to visit suitably robust sites, a policy that HE is continuing. Thus 
in practice the regulatory objectives of the two Acts have increasingly coincided. It is 
thus difficult to understand why the use of the 1979 Act, on suitably robust sites that 
can sustain public access, should be any more disadvantageous than use of the 
1973 Act. Equally, control of any intrusive activities on scheduled monuments could 
be regulated by Scheduled Monument Consent, with conditions attached, in the 
same manner as Licences are granted with conditions under the 1973 Act. Indeed, in 
that the 1979 Act does not require the processing of licences for visiting as the 1973 
Act does, the burden of heritage management on HE is eased, while prohibition of 
intrusion or damage is achieved. 
Nor, despite the reference to “the high costs of assessment and post-designation 
management” does there appear to be any significant disparity of costs between the 
two statutory mechanisms. HE receives archaeological assessments from its diving 
contractor for archaeological support153 but it is difficult to see how the costs would 
not be identical for sites protected under the 1973 Act or the 1979 Act. Furthermore it 
would appear that HE has failed to consider how monitoring and survey for 
Scheduled Monuments could be achieved by use of avocational archaeological 
volunteers. HE, through its predecessor English Heritage, has considerable 
experience of using avocational archaeological divers to monitor, survey and even 
intrusively investigate sites designated under the 1973 Act.154 Avocational teams, 
licensed annually by HE, conduct such archaeological operations and submit annual 
reports. Indeed HE can be said to be a world leader in the utilisation of avocational 
teams, some of whom have achieved results of internationalsignificance.155 Such 
avocational monitoring and surveying could similarly be utilised in respect of 
Scheduled Monuments underwater. Monitoring would require no authorisation, while 
surveying and any intrusive activity could be authorised by Scheduled Monument 
Consent with conditions attached for submission of annual reports in a comparable 
manner to the 1973 Act.156 This avocational resource is of considerable benefit to 
HE, much more so in the age of public funding austerity which the UK is currently 
enduring, and HE’s apparent failure even to contemplate its utilisation for Scheduled 
Monuments below MLWM is all the more disappointing given its extensive use for 
designated wreck sites under the 1973 Act. 
Finally the comments that “… the Marine Planning is beyond the terrestrial planning 
system and approaches are different” and that “protection for such sites is being 
sought through entry on the Marine Record and the development of a protocol with 
the Marine Management Organisation” (“the MMO”) are 
 
highly suggestive of an unnecessarily limited and terrestrially focused vision for the 
use of the 1979 Act. That the legislature intended the 1979 Act to be utilised 
underwater is beyond disputation.157 Furthermore MACAA, which introduced the 
new marine planning system, did not in any way amend this intention. Thus the 
utilisation of scheduling under the 1979 Act is not solely predicated on the nature of 
either the terrestrial or the marine planning systems and is clearly intended to 
continue to operate in both the terrestrial and marine spheres, notwithstanding the 
introduction of the new regulatory framework for marineplanning.158 Nor can it be 
said that this new marine planning system affords the same degree of protection as 
scheduling. Marine planning is given effect primarily through the accompanying 
marine licensing system. A marine licence is now required for a “marine licensable 
activity”.159 While such licensable activities encompass development projects160 
they are subject to a number of significant exceptions,161 such as navigational 
maintenance dredging by Harbour Authorities,162 and do not encompass damaging 
activities such as anchoring or the recovery of objects by hand. Consequently the 
marine planning system, the marine licensing system and the development of 
protocols with the MMO do not afford the degree of protection that scheduling would 
do so. Furthermore even if damaging or intrusive activities were prohibited by 
designation under the PMRA 1986, that Act would not provide for heritage 
management through site monitoring, so unauthorised intrusion or environmental 
threats such as erosion of the seabed would not be detectable. In short neither entry 
on the Marine Record nor the development of protocols with the MMO can provide 
the degree of protection or site management that a more imaginative use of the 1979 
Act could afford. 
Conclusion 
It would appear that as a result of budgetary pressures, HE has attempted to amend 
its policy in relation to scheduling below MLWM so as to use a blanket refusal to 
consider such an option, irrespective of the individual circumstances of the site in 
question or the merits of the application to schedule. In doing so HE evolved a policy 
within a policy, HE’s new policy being seemingly based primarily upon the perceived 
implications for its resources. The resulting dichotomy of policy between DCMS and 
its statutory advisers is at best confusing to both the marine archaeological 
community and the public, at worst it may be ultra vires. At times of unprecedented 
public funding austerity statutory agencies such as HE need to build support 
amongst their public constituencies. Formulating such an approach is potentially 
alienating and does not seem well designed to achieve this. 
The 1979 Act also appears to offer a versatile instrument for managing underwater 
sites. Indeed on suitably robust sites the 1979 Act may fit HE’s public access agenda 
better than the 1973 Act, delivering the public access that HE desires, without the 
resource implications generated pursuant to the granting of licences for visiting 
under the 1973 Act. Moreover there seems little reason why the 1979 Act could not 
be used in conjunction with avocational resources in a similar manner to the 1973 
Act. This then throws into question HE’s declared “focus” on the 1973 Act below the 
MLWM. The potential of the 1979 Act below the MLWM may have been inadvertently 
overlooked and a comparative reappraisal of the two Acts by HE may now be 
appropriate. 
The applicants in the scheduling process described in this article remain none the 
wiser as to the underlying reasoning of the decisions not to schedule.163 However 
the duty to give reasons seems to have evolved to a point where it is, to a greater or 
lesser degree, a uniform requirement, whatever the matter under consideration by 
the statutory agency. This judicial drift is attributable to a greater willingness to apply 
this requirement by analogy in circumstances where there is no express legislative 
requirement to do so. It would seem to be clear from the contemporary judgments 
discussed above that HE and the Secretary of State should now conform to this 
evolving Administrative Law orthodoxy. 
Finally both these matters and the McMorn and Mott cases appear to have revealed 
a surprising gap in statutory agencies’ awareness relating to the constraints imposed 
upon the formulation of policies and decision-making thereunder by the basic 
principles of Administrative Law. As austerity continues and public funding becomes 
even more restricted, stakeholders are likely to turn even more frequently to a 
potential judicial review process to protect what they view as priorities for continued 
funding. Such challenges, based upon Administrative Law, to policies driven by 
financial constraints may therefore become even more prolific, notwithstanding the 
obstacles to an application.164 It may well be the case that staff development 
programmes in the public sector could beneficially incorporate awareness training in 
the evolving tenets of Administrative Law. 
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